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THE RIGHTS OF STATISTICAL PEOPLE 
Lisa Heinzerling* 
The use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the wisdom of life-
saving regulatory programs presents a puzzle. Deciding to allow one per-
son to harm, even to kill, another person on the basis of how much it 
costs the person doing the harm to refrain from doing it denies the person 
harmed a right against harm. It makes a person's freedom from harm, 
indeed her life, contingent upon the financial profile of the life-
threatening activity. 
The puzzle is that we do not allow this kind of cost-benefit balanc-
ing in all life-threatening contexts. We do not, for example, believe that 
so long as it is worth $10 million to one person to see another person 
dead, and so long as current estimates of the value of human life are 
lower than $10 million, it is acceptable for the first person to shoot and 
kill the second. Indeed, in this setting we refrain entirely from placing a 
monetary value on life. Yet when it comes to regulatory programs that 
prevent deaths-deaths also due to the actions of other people-it has 
become commonplace to argue that the people doing the harm should be 
allowed to act so long as it would cost more for them to stop doing the 
harm than the harm is worth in monetary terms. Why are these two situa-
tions coming to be viewed so differently? 
In this Comment, I argue that the use of cost-benefit analysis to 
evaluate life-saving regulatory programs has, in a society that eschews 
reliance on cost-benefit analysis in other life-saving situations, been 
justified by the creation of a new kind of entity-the statistical person. A 
primary feature of the statistical person, as I will explain, is that she is 
unidentified; she is no one's sister, or daughter, or mother. Indeed, in one 
conception, the statistical person is not a person at all, but rather only a 
collection of risks. By distinguishing statistical lives from the lives of 
those we know, economic analysts have attempted to sidestep the uncom-
fortable fact that most of us profess ourselves quite incapable of identi-
fying the monetary equivalent of the lives of our sisters, daughters, moth-
ers, and friends. 
The framing of life in statistical terms has generated, for statistical 
people, two disadvantages not suffered by those whose lives are not so 
framed. First, the people whose lives are framed in statistical terms are 
explicitly priced in advance of their deaths. Second, this pricing has 
come to vary depending on the age, health, disability status, and wealth 
of the people who might be harmed. Thus the most basic kind of right-
the right to be protected from physical harm caused by other people, on 
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he right to be protected from physical harm caused by other people, on 
equal terms with other people-is denied to those whose lives are framed 
in statistical terms. 
Despite the increasing importance of the concept of statistical life in 
informing regulatory policy, regulatory scholars to date have not pro-
vided a standard definition of the statistical life. There are two possible 
conceptions of statistical life. According to the first conception, a statis-
tical life is a life expected to be lost as a function of probabilities of 
death applied to a population of persons. On this understanding, the sali-
ent features of the statistical life are un identifiability and uncertainty: the 
person who is expected to die is not identifiable before (or perhaps even 
after) death, and the probabilistic estimates are uncertain. The second 
conception of statistical life is that it is not a life at all, but only an ag-
gregation of relatively small risks of harm to the individuals in a popula-
tion. These risks can be summed, together with the size of the popula-
tion, to estimate how many lives are likely to be lost as a result of the 
risk. But, under this conception, "statistical life" refers to the collective 
risk, not to life itself. 
Neither of these two conceptions of the statistical life justifies the 
differential treatment that regulatory policy has begun to afford statistical 
and nonstatistical life. Identifiability does not explain our differing re-
sponses to situations that threaten the lives of others; our varying reac-
tions likely have more to do with identifying with the victim of the threat. 
Moreover, any person in a situation of risk can be framed in statistical or 
nonstatistical terms. Making regulatory policy turn on this framing 
threatens to ratify the apathy or prejudice society may exhibit toward 
certain kinds of people or certain kinds of risks. As for uncertainty, the 
analytical devices that have sprung up around statistical lives-moneti-
zation according to willingness-to-pay and according to age, health, and 
disability-simply have nothing to do with the uncertainty of estimates 
of physical risk. Using monetary valuations, and discriminatory ones at 
that, to adjust for scientific uncertainty cloaks scientific uncertainty in the 
garb of moral choice. It is, among other things, a strange commentary on 
our times that it has proven easier to persuade regulatory agencies to 
abandon their longstanding commitment to the equal worth of human 
lives than it has proven to persuade them that their scientific analysis is 
unsound. 
The idea that a statistical life is really not a life at all, but only an 
aggregation of relatively small risks of harm, also does not justify differ-
ential treatment of statistical and nonstatistical lives. Close examination 
of the manipulations analysts perform on the monetary valuation of sta-
tistical life-including discounting and adjusting for life-years saved-
reveals that these analysts in fact treat statistical lives as lives, and not 
merely as collections of small risks. Since the statistical life, according to 
this second conception, turns out to be a life after all, and not simply an 
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aggregation of risks, the ground for distinguishing it from nonstatistical 
lives evaporates. 
1. DISCRIMINATORY PRICING 
Much modern regulation aims to prevent people from being killed 
by the actions of other people. In discussing the benefits of this kind of 
regulation, regulators often refer to the lives of the people who would 
have died without the regulation as "statistical."! Below, this Comment 
will develop and explore several different possible meanings of statistical 
life. For now, I would like to establish how important the modifier "sta-
tistical" has become in influencing the discourse concerning life-saving 
measures. In particular, I will try to show how common it has become to 
strip statistical lives of rights against harm enjoyed by those whose lives 
are not described in statistical terms. 
People whose lives are described in statistical terms suffer from two 
large disadvantages. First, the lives of statistical people are explicitly 
priced in advance of their deaths. We are told, for example, that the life 
of a statistical person is worth $5.8 million to the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency,2 $2.5 million to the Department of Transportation,3 and 
$5 million to the Consumer Product Safety Commission.4 The analysts 
who have helped develop these monetary values readily explain that the 
values do not apply to "identified" lives, nor to the deaths of "named in-
dividuals," but only to "statistical" lives.s They deny having any special 
knowledge of the value of identified lives, and they appear to tolerate, if 
not embrace, the widely held assumption that we will do more to avoid 
the death of an identified person than to avoid the death of a statistical 
person.6 As a result, identified lives remain unpriced while statistical 
lives wear price tags. 
1. For a recent example, see Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: 
Proposed Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Re-
quirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 26,004, 26,079 (1999) (to be codified at 40 C.P.R. pts. 80, 85-
86). 
2. See Radon in Drinking Water Health Risk Reduction and Cost Analysis, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 9560, 9576 (1999). 
3. See Memorandum from Walter B. McCormick, Jr., General Counsel, U.S. Dep't 
of Transp., & Jeffrey N. Shane, Assistant Secretary for Policy and Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dep't 
of Transp., to Assistant Secretaries and Modal Adm'rs, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Treatment of 
Value of Life and Injuries in Preparing Economic Evaluations 2 (Jan. 8, 1993) (on file with 
the Harvard Environmental Law Review) [hereinafter McCormick & Shane]. 
4. See U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, ESTIMATING THE COST TO SOCIETY 
OF CONSUMER PRODUCT INJURIES: THE REVISED INJURY COST MODEL 6-8 (Jan. 1998). 
5. See W. Kip VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES 
FOR RISK 21 (1992) [hereinafter VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS]; Thomas C. Schelling, The 
Life You Save May Be Your Own, in THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCES 
113 (1984). 
6. See generally VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 5, at 21, 29. 
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It might be argued that, in fact, our legal system prices identified 
lives as well: the tort system has for many years effectively priced 
identified human lives by awarding compensation for wrongful deaths.7 
Because the tort system responds to harms that have already occurred, 
and because its remedy is money damages, the system faces a choice 
between not providing financial compensation for wrongful deaths, be-
cause lives are priceless, or providing compensation for them and risking 
damage to the belief that human lives are beyond price. Refusing to com-
pensate at all for a death caused by wrongful action would seem a per-
verse way of giving force to a belief in the pricelessness of human life. 
Thus tort law, at least, can plausibly place a monetary value on human 
life for purposes of retrospective compensation, and at the same time 
hold to the belief that human lives should remain, in a fundamental 
sense, unpriced. 
Resolving the contradiction between pricelessness and pricing when 
a monetary value is placed on human lives in advance of death presents a 
more difficult conundrum. In that case, the government in essence de-
cides that it is not worth more than a certain finite sum of money to pre-
vent someone from dying, even when death will come about through the 
actions of another person, and even when the person being killed has 
done nothing wrong. This proposition is equivalent to saying that a per-
son can kill another person if it would cost too much to avoid killing her. 
This is a striking proposition, and so far one that has been applied only to 
lives described in statistical terms. Indeed, as mentioned above, the major 
writers in the literature on the pricing of human lives take pains to em-
phasize that they are discussing only statistical lives.8 Government ana-
lysts have been equally fastidious about the distinction between the value 
of an identifiable life and the value of a statisticallife.9 
The second disadvantage to being a statistical person is that statisti-
cal lives are valued differently from each other on the basis of character-
istics not used to distinguish among nonstatistical lives. Some analysts 
lately have become dissatisfied with the practice of placing an equal 
monetary value on all statistical lives. Lives are never saved, they ob-
7. See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 89 (1985). 
8. See, e.g., VISCUSI, FATAL ThADEOFFS, supra note 5, at 19. 
9. An internal memo of the Department of Transportation advises: 
Under limited circumstances, computational procedures in investment analyses 
may require insertion of an explicit value for fatalities averted. In such limited 
cases, the [willingness-to-pay] value can be used, but the accompanying text 
should avoid implying that the Department has set a dollar price on lives or 
injuries. Rather than saying something like, "The Office of the Secretary has 
set the value of life at $2.5 million dollars ... " the preferable language would 
be more like, "Economic research indicates that $2.5 million per statistical 
life saved is a reasonable estimate of people's willingness to pay for safety." 
McCormick & Shane, supra note 3, at 4 (emphasis added). 
HeinOnline -- 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 193 2000
2000] The Rights of Statistical People 193 
serve, but only prolonged, and thus, it only makes sense to ask by how 
much regulation prolongs the lives it protects. lO Thus, we now see a pa-
rade of normally equality-minded writers extolling the virtues of evalu-
ating regulatory action on the basis of the number of "quality-adjusted 
life-years" saved by it.ll (Often the concept goes by the even more occlu-
sive abbreviation "QALY.") This technical approach obscures its impli-
cations: that regulation saving the statistical lives of the elderly, the sick, 
and the disabled will be a lower priority than regulation saving the statis-
tical lives of the young, the healthy, and the able-bodied. One's age, 
health, and disability status suddenly have become good grounds for dis-
tinguishing the value of one's life from another, for the explicit reason 
that the lives of those situated on the undesirable side of the statuses of 
age, health, and ability (the elderly, the sick, and the disabled) are worth 
less than the lives on the desirable side.12 And, although few analysts will 
admit it, the upshot of the prevailing method for valuing statistical 
lives-which asks how much individuals are willing to pay to reduce risk 
in their own lives-also favors the statistical lives of the rich over the 
statistical lives of the poor.13 
The disaggregation of statistical lives based on characteristics like 
age, health, disability status, and wealth deserves notice not only because 
of the inequality it facilitates, but also because it subtly alters the very 
concept of statistical life. Although the concept of statistical life has sev-
eral possible meanings, all of these meanings contain one common fea-
ture: a statistical life is an unidentified life. We do not know the names of 
statistical people. Indeed, prior to the recent interest in disaggregating 
statistical people, one would have said that we know nothing about sta-
tistical people except that they are humans. But now, we are beginning to 
learn various facts about the statistical people whom regulation affects, 
10. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 259, 260 
(1997). 
11. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory 
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 83-85 (1995). 
12. The Food and Drug Administration recently described the benefits of a rule in 
tenns of the "quality-adjusted life-days" affected by the rule. Preliminary Regulatory Im-
pact Analysis and Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of the Proposed Rule to Require 
Refrigeration of Shell Eggs at Retail and Safe Handling Labels, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,516, 
36,522 (1999). The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has been slower to embrace 
QALYs as the measure of the benefits of its rules. Compare Regulatory Impact Analysis 
for the Petroleum Refineries NESHAP, EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, 
EPA-4521R-004, at 174 (Aug. 1995) (suggesting that "[l]ife years saved may be a more 
relevant measure" of regulatory benefits than lives saved) with EPA, THE BENEFITS AND 
COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT: 1970 TO 1990, EPA Office of Air and Radiation, at ES-9 
(1997) (noting problems associated with calculating life-saving benefits based on life-years 
·saved). 
13. See W. Kip Viscusi, Equivalent Frames of Reference for Judging Risk Regula-
tion Policies, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 431, 447 (1994) ("[T]he United States Department of 
Transportation should want to place a higher value of life on the well-being of the lives of 
airline passengers than those killed in motor-vehicle crashes because the airline passengers 
have a higher income:'). 
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such as whether they are young or old, healthy or unhealthy. We should 
expect that, if this disaggregation continues, we will soon know whether 
the statistical lives relevant to a regulatory decision are men or women, 
white or black, infants or preschoolers. 
The evaluation of life expectancy alone has the potential to intro-
duce many such specific features of a person's identity into the regulatory 
equation. A large lurking question, neglected in the recent rush to em-
brace QALY s, is what baseline level of life expectancy to use in calcu-
lating the life-years lost due to a given hazard. 14 In keeping with the 
whole premise of the QALY movement-that only the portion of life 
actually lost due to regulation should concern regulators-there is good 
reason to expect that the baseline level will be the life expectancy of the 
group to which the affected people belong, insofar as group identity is an 
important determinant of life expectancy. IS Thus, one can imagine race, 
ethnicity, socioeconomic status, gender, and other life expectancy-related 
characteristics all being fed, quite invisibly, into the equation that deter-
mines the worth of a person's life. In this way, the very identifiedness 
that, when it comes to nonstatistical people, helps justify their equal 
protection from harm, becomes, for statistical people, the very thing that 
leads to inequality among them. 
Whether consciously or unconsciously, analysts have softened the 
discriminatory appearance of these analytic developments in two ways. 
First, rather than using as a baseline the life expectancy of the specific 
group to which the affected statistical people belong, analysts typically 
use the average life expectancy of the whole population. For example, in 
one influential analysis,16 Robert Hahn of the American Enterprise Insti-
tute calculated life-years saved by comparing the average age of death from 
broad categories of hazards-such as "accident;' "fire," "worker injury," and 
"cancer"-to estimates of the average life expectancy of the entire popu-
lation of people of a given age.17 The use of overall life expectancy as the 
baseline for comparison avoids the awkward fact that life expectancy is 
strongly associated with statuses like race, gender, disability, and socio-
economic status. While it may be that analysts like Hahn use overall life 
expectancy rather than the specific life expectancy of the group to which 
14. See Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 
2025,2062,2075-76 (1999). 
15. Professor Revesz has proposed that regulatory analysts consider the "age 
profiles" of the population targeted by regulation. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 
941,967 n.120 (1999). 
16. The Office of Management and Budget relies heavily on Hahn's analysis in de-
veloping its own estimates of the costs and benefits of environmental regulation. See 
OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET. RE-
PORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 16 (1998). 
17. See Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Refonn: What Do the Government's Numbers 
Tell Us?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 208, 247 n.40 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996). 
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the target population belongs as a means of avoiding inappropriate dis-
tinctions between classes of people, one must then wonder why the same 
concern for equality does not persuade them to abandon the entire QALY 
project. ls 
A second way analysts have attempted to soften the discriminatory 
thrust of currently popular methods of valuing human life is to avoid 
making these valuations, and thus, life-saving policies, turn on ability, 
rather than Willingness, to pay. In other words, they have tried to dilute 
the effect of wealth on the valuation of life. Professor Kornhauser, for 
example, suggests that life be valued according to the preferences of a 
group that has an "acceptable" level of wealth, such as the median wealth 
of the overall population.19 Similarly, Professor Revesz proposes valuing 
lives based on the preferences of a population having "representative 
characteristics of the population of the United States," and argues that 
valuations be adjusted upward where the subjects of willingness-to-pay 
studies "have relatively low incomes" compared to the group targeted by 
regulation.20 Under both proposals, of course, wealth would still deter-
mine the Willingness to pay for risk reduction and thus the value of sta-
tistical life, but the value of life would be nudged upwards by excluding 
the highly income-constrained preferences of the worst off among us. 
Thus, analysts have obscured-but not eliminated-the unequal 
protection of life afforded by identifying the features of human lives that 
make them worth saving or not. Most important for present purposes, 
however, is the fact that analysts have often used the bare adjective "sta-
tistical" to justify their pricing of, and discriminations among, human 
lives.21 What is it about statistical lives that supposedly makes them so 
expendable? Answering this question requires an exploration of the dif-
ferent possible meanings of statistical life. 
II. UNIDENTIFIABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY 
The literature on risk and its regulation contains two different con-
ceptions of the statistical life. According to the first conception, the sta-
tistical life is a life expected to be lost as a function of probabilities of 
death applied to a population of persons. The person expected to die is 
not identifiable in advance of death, and the probabilistic estimates are 
18. See Heinzeriing, Environmental Law and the Present Future, supra note 14, at 
2075-76. 
19. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Value of Life, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 209, 221-22 
(1990). 
20. Revesz, supra note 15, at 967-68. 
21. See, e.g., Jeremy D. Fraiberg & Michael J. Trebilcock, Risk Regulation: Techno-
cratic and Democratic Tools for Regulatory Refonn, 43 MCGILL L.J. 835, 860 (1998); 
James F. Blumstein, Rational Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy 
Analysis, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1345, 1353-54 (1981). 
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uncertain.22 However, neither unidentifiability nor uncertainty justifies 
differential protection against harm for statistical and nonstatistical peo~ 
pIe. 
A. Un identifiability 
One of the features thought to set the statistical life apart from the 
nonstatisticallife is unidentifiability. We will spend a fortune, it is regu~ 
lady remarked, to rescue miners trapped in a mine, or a little girl trapped 
in a well, or a downed balloonist, but we will not spend an equivalent 
amount to protect these people from getting in harm's way in the first 
place.23 Observers have asserted that the identifiedness of the miners, the 
little girl, and the balloonist makes us especially willing to help them.24 
As an empirical matter, this assertion is unproved and probably mistaken. 
As a normative matter, it seems clear that the rights of people not to be 
harmed should not depend on the identifiedness of the people who will be 
harmed. 
There is good reason to believe that our willingness to spend money, 
time, and other resources to save someone from harm does not turn on 
the identifiedness of the person who will be harmed unless we intervene. 
When Tylenol capsules were contaminated with cyanide and placed on 
the market in the fall of 1982, no one knew which capsules contained the 
cyanide. Accordingly, no one knew who would be poisoned if no preven-
tive measures were taken. This unidentifiedness did not soften the re-
sponse that followed the first poisonings. Indeed, it arguably magnified it, 
as unidentifiedness is a close cousin of the awful randomness-associ-
ated with terrorists and criminal maniacs-that many people uniquely 
fear.25 
Contrast our response to the Tylenol poisonings with an equally fa-
miliar response to an identified life. Many of us who live in large urban 
areas come face to face, weekly if not daily, with homeless people who 
look cold, hungry, desperate, and sick. Often these people explicitly ask 
for our help and we do not give it. Or we give a little-a dime, a quarter, 
a dollar or two-enough to assuage our consciences but not enough 
really to help. Yet it is hard to imagine a more clearly identified person in 
need. 
22. Scholars who appear to embrace this conception of a statistical life include, 
among many others, Charles Fried and W. Kip Viscusi. See VISCUSI, supra note 5, at 21. 
See generally Charles Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1969). 
23. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 20-21 (1978); 
Fried, supra note 22, at 1415. 
24. See Fried, supra note 22, at 1428-33 (labeling this the "personalist" argument). 
25. See Murder by Capsule, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,1982, at A30. 
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The different responses to the Tylenol poisonings and to the home-
less raise the possibility that the "identifiedness" that increases our will-
ingness to save others from harm has little to do with our being able to 
identify the victim of harm. Rather, it probably has more to do with our 
being able to identify with her. Making individual-or, worse, public-
responsibility to aid another person turn on the extent to which the 
person who needs help is like the people who might help her is a covert, 
but effective, way of making characteristics like race, class, gender, age, 
and personal habits determinative of our obligations to others. This 
approach is, needless to say, the antithesis of a regime of rights. In this 
way, the issue of identifiability also bears a strong resemblance to the 
unequal treatment of statistical people. People whose lives are framed in 
statistical terms thus suffer twice: first, when their lives are labeled 
statistical simply because the people doing the labeling do not identify 
with them, and second, when their lives are devalued precisely because 
they are statistical. 
The possibility that the word "statistical" will be used as cover for 
an unconscious or invidious failure to identify with the person in danger 
is heightened by the fact that virtually any person in a situation of danger 
can be described in either statistical (unidentified) or nonstatistical 
(identified) terms. The classification of a threatened person as statistical 
or nonstatisticallargely turns on one's definition of the harm the person 
faces and its cause. In the case of the homeless person, for example, one 
might say that the harms this person faces are acute hunger and exposure 
to the elements, and that the causes of these harms are inadequate food, 
clothing, and shelter. These are immediate harms, readily addressed by 
interventions anyone of us might make. But if one says that the harm the 
homeless person suffers is poverty, and the causes are a lack of educa-
tion, mental illness, and societal discrimination, then simple interven-
tions seem inadequate indeed. Thus, if the obligation to help turns on 
whether the life of the person in need of help is framed in statistical or 
nonstatistical terms, we can give that obligation any shape and scope we 
want through our definition of harm and causation. And, oddly enough, 
the more chronic, intractable, and widespread the harm as we describe 
it-the more "statistical" the harm and its cause-the less will be the 
responsibility to intervene. 
Returning, finally, to the paradigmatic cases of the identified vic-
tim-the trapped miner, the little girl in a well, the downed balloonist-it 
becomes obvious upon reflection that identifiedness-as in, what is the 
person's name? what does she look like?-probably has little to do with 
our willingness to help. Rescue workers traveled halfway across the 
world to try to locate survivors of the massive earthquake that hit Turkey 
in August 1999, yet most of those people found were not identifiable in 
advance of their rescues. They were known only by their cries for help. 
In that case, the important factor was that there was no doubt that the 
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people buried in the rubble of the quake were in grave danger. The 
knowledge that might distinguish these victims from other people in 
need, therefore, is not knowledge of their personal identities, but knowl-
edge of their need for help. Perhaps it is uncertainty, then, that distin-
guishes the statistical from the nonstatisticallife. 
B. Uncertainty 
Suppose one million people are each exposed to a hazard estimated 
to pose a one-in-one-million risk of death. One life would be the ex-
pected loss to this population facing this probability of death. To say that 
this life is "statistical" might mean one of two things. Both relate to the 
uncertainty of the probabilistic estimate. 
In one sense, the word "statistical" is a kind of pejorative; it often 
connotes an association that is contingent or random rather than intrinsic 
or causal. For example, suppose that ninety percent of all airplane 
crashes in the last two decades occurred on Tuesdays, yet only five per-
cent of all airplane flights occurred on Tuesdays. Suppose further that 
regression analyses of the facts surrounding airplane crashes rule out, to 
a ninety-five percent certainty, the possibility that the association be-
tween flying on Tuesdays and airplane crashes is random. Yet assume 
that researchers lack any theory about why Tuesdays are especially dan-
gerous for air travel. One might then regard estimates of the number of 
lives expected to be lost during Tuesday airplane flights as estimates of 
the loss of "statistical" life because the association between Tuesdays 
and crashes has been established only statistically. 
This meaning of statistical life does not justify the monetization of, 
nor discrimination between, statistical lives. At most, the idea that statis-
tical lives are different because the threat to them has been probabilisti-
cally identified, but not causally explained, suggests that we should pro-
ceed cautiously in our response to the hazard. If we believe that the prob-
abilistic association we have identified is coincidental rather than causal, 
then we would be well advised to study the matter further before under-
taking a major regulatory intervention. But if the statistical probabilities 
have been established over a large enough number of cases, in different 
settings, then the lack of a causal theory explaining the statistical asso-
ciation between the two events should not stop us from taking action. For 
example, it was not until 1996 that scientists identified the mechanistic 
link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer.26 Prior to that time, the 
connection between smoking and cancer had been established only sta-
tistically, through decades of epidemiological and biological research. 
26. See Mikhail F. Denissenko et aI., Preferential Formation oj Benzo[a}pyrene Ad· 
ducts at Lung Cancer Mutational Hotspots in P53, 274 SCI. 430, 430 (1996). 
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Yet the absence of a causal theory did not prevent widespread acceptance 
of the idea that smoking causes lung cancer.27 
More fundamentally, cautiousness in the face of uncertainty is not 
the same as a distinction based on value. If scientific uncertainty is the 
issue, then the solution is not to declare that statistical lives are less im-
portant, less valuable, more expendable, than nonstatistical lives, or that 
the age or health or wealth of the people who might be harmed should 
inform our willingness to help them. Monetization of human life and 
distinctions among humans based on age, health, disability, and wealth, 
have nothing to do with the meaning of statistical life that I am here con-
sidering. If the uncertainty of probabilistic estimates distinguishes statis-
tical from nonstatistical life, then this uncertainty should be inserted in 
the regulatory equation as an adjustment to the probabilities themselves, 
and not as an adjustment to the value being measured. Doing otherwise 
allows scientific disagreement over the existence and magnitude of risk 
to masquerade as a value choice about who in our society is worth saving 
and at what cost. 
Scientific uncertainty also may underlie another conception of sta-
tistical life. Even where there exists a causal theory as to why one 
event-say, exposure to asbestos-produces an adverse result, there may 
be disagreement over the conditions under which the adverse result will 
materialize. A statistical life might therefore be the life expected to be 
lost if each of a series of assumptions about the world holds true. But 
because the assumptions are uncertain, the loss of life is uncertain, too. 
Modern risk assessment, which forms the basis of much health-
related regulation, attempts to determine the probability of future harm to 
individuals exposed to particular hazards.28 This analysis requires many 
assumptions about the potency of the hazard, the magnitude of expo-
sures, and the susceptibility of the individuals to the harm in question. 
Often the assumptions must be made in the absence of conclusive proof. 
For example, many risk assessments attempt to determine the probability 
of cancer in a human population exposed to a particular substance by 
considering the effect of that substance on an animal population, such as 
rats or mice.29 Extrapolating the results in animal studies to the human 
27. See Denise Grady, So, Smoking Causes Cancer: This Is News?, N.Y. 'liMES, Oct. 
27,1996, at D3. See also American Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027,1055-56 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (rejecting the argument that the EPA could not regulate fine particulate pollution 
until it established the "biological mechanism through which particulate pollution causes 
adverse health effects"). 
28. The literature on quantitative risk assessment is enormous. For general discus-
sion, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 
(1994). 
29. See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (upholding the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's rule limiting 
workplace exposure to ethylene oxide, based on animal studies); Synthetic Organic Chern. 
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 720 F. Supp. 1244, 1256 (W.D. La. 
1989) (upholding Health and Human Service's classification of certain chemicals as known 
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population requires an assumption about the similarity between the rele-
vant responses of animals and humans.3o Risk assessments must also, to 
take another example, attempt to predict what level of exposure the rele-
vant human population will experience with regard to the substance in 
question. Will the individuals in the population eat the substance, drink 
it, breathe it, or all of these and more? How often? For how many days or 
weeks or years? These are difficult questions to answer in advance. Risk 
assessors must therefore make assumptions about what the future expo-
sures will be to estimate the risk the population faces.31 
Often these assumptions lean in the direction of assumptions that 
will support findings of more rather than less risk. The Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration routinely assumes, for example, that 
worker populations exposed to a risky substance will be so exposed for 
their entire working lives; in other words, the workers will neither switch 
occupations nor quit working altogether nor limit their exposures in an-
other way.32 In fact, many workers do spend their working lives at one 
facility or at one type of facility, thus experiencing similar exposures 
throughout their years of work.33 Yet this kind of assumption has led to 
several memorable depictions of the kinds of people risk assessment as-
sumes -to exist. Justice Breyer, for example, brought us the "dirt-eating 
children playing in . . . a swamp" by way of arguing that the govern-
ment's decisions to clean up hazardous waste sites are often extrava-
gant.34 More recently, John Applegate has conjured the image of the "na-
ked dirt-eating farmer," assumed in Environmental Protection Agency 
analyses of the risks from a nuclear weapons production facility in 
Ohio-a farmer who consumes the food, and some of the soil, from his 
own farm, and in the meantime covers his naked body with the farm's 
soiJ.35 
Although no one has said so explicitly, I believe that the practice of 
using these kinds of assumptions in risk assessment may be what lies 
behind the demotion of "real" human lives to "statistical" lives. It may be 
or suspected carcinogens based on results in animal studies). 
30. For discussion of this assumption, see Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk 
Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,966-68 (1996) (proposed Apr. 23,1996). 
31. See, e.g., Leather Indus. of Am. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392, 403-05 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(remanding an EPA rule for failure "to demonstrate a rational relationship between its 
highly conservative exposure assumptions and the actual usage regulated by those assump-
tions"). 
32. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION 46 (1993). 
33. Cj. Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The 
Risky Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 351 (1995) 
(explaining why a similar assumption about residential exposures is not overly conserva-
tive). 
34. See BREYER, supra note 32, at 12. 
35. See John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not and End in Itself: The Role of Risk 
Assessment in Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1654 (1995). 
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the reason why writers who normally would cringe at distinguishing 
among people based on characteristics like age and class find no 
difficulty embracing such distinctions when it comes to statistical people. 
The idea, I think, is this: statistical people do not exist. There are no dirt-
eating children living in swamps and no naked dirt-eating Ohioan farm-
ers. To be sure, there are children living near hazardous waste sites and 
near nuclear weapons facilities, but there are no children and no adults 
who do the things risk assessment imagines them to do. Thus, the statis-
tical people of risk assessment exist only on paper; there is no person, no 
name, no face, no body, that could be matched to them even if one had 
perfect information. Consequently, to say that a statistical life is expected 
to be lost as a result of a particular hazard is to say that, in reality, no one 
will die. 
If statistical people truly do not exist, if statistical deaths truly do 
not occur, a qualitative distinction between statistical and nonstatistical 
lives would indeed be justified. But the qualitative distinction would be 
the same as that between zero and any positive number. It would not be a 
distinction that would, for example, support attaching a monetary value 
to statistical but not nonstatisticallives. If nonstatisticallives truly do not 
exist, they are not worth $5 million, or $2.5 million, or in fact, anything 
at all; they have no value. The idea that statistical people do not exist also 
would not support distinctions among statistical people; it is incoherent, 
for example, to make age- or health-based distinctions between nonexist-
ent people. Thus, once again, the meaning of statistical life that derives 
from scientific uncertainty does not justify the analytical practices that 
have accompanied the framing of life in statistical terms. 
One might object that even if some statistical deaths do occur-even 
if quantitative risk assessment sometimes correctly predicts some loss of 
life-quantitative risk assessment vastly overstates the number of deaths 
likely to occur. But if the conservatism of quantitative risk assessment 
means only that fewer people may die than we expect-not zero, but 
fewer-then this uncertainty does not justify the qualitative difference in 
the treatment of statistical and nonstatistical lives that I have discussed. 
Only if the actual loss of life is zero-only if no one will die-can the 
situations of the statistical and nonstatisticallives be regarded as qualita-
tively distinct. And, as I have said, they would not be qualitatively dis-
tinct in the way analysts have imagined. 
It would be difficult, however, to support the claim of zero risk. 
Many other assumptions commonly used in risk assessments are just as 
artificial as the ones I have described, but they are artificial in a way that 
likely understates rather than overstates actual risk. For example, one 
standard assumption in risk assessment is that the population targeted by 
regulation has the same susceptibility to the relevant harm as the popula-
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tion studied in the risk assessment.36 Yet most of the epidemiological 
studies underlying the risk assessments used in developing regulation 
have involved only white male workers; women, children, the elderly, 
racial and ethnic minorities, and poor people may be more vulnerable to 
the risks in question than the relatively healthy white male workers as-
sumed in most analyses.37 The dueling assumptions of risk assessment-
some conservative, some not-provide little support for the notion that 
statistical lives (and deaths) simply do not exist. 
The necessity of maintaining the zero-risk scenario, which justifies 
a qualitative distinction between statistical and nonstatistical lives, may 
help to explain the incredible durability of scientific disagreement in en-
vironmental and health regulation. A quarter-century after the pesticide 
DDT was banned, there appears to be no universal agreement that the 
pesticide was, all things considered, harmful enough to be banned;38 the 
same is true of the two-decade-old ban on PCBs.39 Indeed, there is likely 
no industrial chemical or substance as to the harmfulness of which every-
one of any influence would agree. Equally striking, even when claims of 
the direct harmfulness of a substance are quite undeniable, these claims 
are almost inevitably opposed by the claim that regulating the substance 
would at least indirectly harm the same health-related interests as much 
as, or more than, the substance itself. For example, in the handful of 
cases in which federal courts have struck down health regulations on the 
ground that the regulations took inadequate account of costs, the courts 
have coupled their economic conclusions with the suggestion that the 
regulations would not, in any event, have saved lives on balance, but 
more likely would have taken more lives than they saved.40 This kind of 
reasoning is exactly the kind of "subterfuge" Calabresi and Bobbitt 
would predict to occur in this kind of situation;41 it would, I think, be an 
unusual judge who could say explicitly and unqualifiedly that people will 
die because he struck down a regulation-and that this is fine, because 
the regulation cost too much money. The long latency period of many of 
36. See Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. at 
17,966. 
37. See, e.g., id.; see also Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications 
a/Quantitative RiskAssessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 123. 
38. See George M. Gray & John D. Graham, Regulating Pesticides, ill RISK VERSUS 
RISK: ThADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 173, 173-74, 179, 189 
(John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995). 
39. See BREYER, supra note 32, at 17,92 n.72. 
40. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (invali-
dating EPA's ban on asbestos on grounds that the rule may require spending an unreasona-
bly large amount of money to save a human life and also may have created more risks than 
it avoided because nonasbestos brakes may not be as effective as asbestos brakes); Ameri-
can Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (invalidating EPA's national 
air quality standard for ozone on grounds that EPA failed to articulate an intelligible lim-
iting principle for its standard and that ozone may be beneficial to human health because 
pollution may block cancer-causing ultraviolet radiation). 
41. See generally CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 23. 
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the human diseases prevented by environmental and health regulation 
helps to preserve the subterfuge, as latency frustrates efforts to make a 
clear and crisp causal connection between exposure and harm. If the 
subterfuge were abandoned, if the zero-risk scenario were ever elimi-
nated, it would become clear that human lives are being priced in ad-
vance of their deaths, based on explicit classifications the legal system 
normally would eschew. 
Thus, preserving the zero-risk hypothesis by emphasizing and per-
haps fomenting scientific disagreement maintains the qualitative distinc-
tion between statistical and nonstatisticallives. I repeat, however, that the 
qualitative distinction thus maintained-between real lives and nonexist-
ent ones-does not justify the analytical devices that have been devel-
oped for statistical lives, namely monetization based on age, health, dis-
ability, and wealth. 
In sum, neither identifiability nor scientific uncertainty justifies the 
differential treatment of statistical and nonstatistical lives. Perhaps an-
other way of conceptualizing the statistical life would justify this treat-
ment. 
III. RISK 
The second conception of the statistical life is that it is really not a 
life at all, but merely an aggregation of relatively small risks of harm to 
the individuals in a population. These risks can be summed, in combina-
tion with the size of the population, to determine how many lives are 
likely to be lost as a result of the risks. But, under this conception, "sta-
tistical life" refers to the collective risk, not to the life itself. According 
to this second understanding of the statistical life, a statistical life is in-
deed qualitatively different from a nonstatistical life because it is not a 
life at all but only a collection of risks. 
This second approach is adopted, formally at least, by the analysts 
who advocate valuing life-saving measures according to individuals' 
willingness to pay.42 These analysts note that while it is difficult to per-
suade people to think rationally and economically about the certain pros-
pect of their own deaths, they can think rationally and economically 
about small increments of risk.43 To put the idea in concrete terms: if 
each person in a population of 1000 faces a 111000 risk of death from a 
particular hazard, and each person is willing to pay $5 to eliminate this 
risk to herself, then the value of a "statistical life" in this population is 
$5,000. But, as analysts repeatedly remind us, it is the collection of 1000 
42. See W. KIp VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 45-46 (1998). 
43. The seminal discussion is Schelling's. See Schelling, supra note 5, at 126-28. 
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risks of 111000, and not life itself, being valued here.44 In practice, how-
ever, analysts treat the valuation achieved by consulting willingness-to-
pay as a valuation of life itself. Since the statistical life, according to this 
second conception, thus turns out to be a life after all, and not just a col-
lection of risks, the ground for distinguishing it from nonstatistical lives 
disappears. 
One way in which analysts treat the valuation of risk as equivalent 
to a valuation of life is that they do not calculate the value of both statis-
tical life and life itself.45 They calculate only the value of statistical life. 
They do not go on to observe that their calculations drastically understate 
the value of their programs because they measure only the value of risk 
and not the value of life. The value of a discrete risk, however, remains 
the same regardless of whether anyone actually ends up dying as a result 
of that risk. Risk and death are two separate injuries.46 If analysts be-
haved consistently with their claim that the monetary value of a statistical 
life reflects only risk and not life itself, they would either substantially 
upgrade their estimates of the benefits of life-saving programs by, for 
example, adding some measure of the loss of life itself (a rather outdated 
possibility would be the measure of lifetime earnings lost as a result of 
premature death),47 or by acknowledging in every case that their esti-
mates of the value of life-saving programs are dramatically understated 
because they reflect only risk and not life. Analysts do neither of these 
two things. It is hard, therefore, to escape the impression that, despite 
their protestations to the contrary, they do indeed believe they have found 
the measure of the value of life and not just risk. 
Second, analysts commonly discount the monetary value of statisti-
cal life to reflect the temporal lag, if any, between the costs and benefits 
of regulation.48 But rather than discounting from the moment when risk is 
imposed, they discount from the probable moment of death. In fact, the 
Office of Management and Budget recommends this practice.49 If, how-
44. See, e.g., VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY, slIpra note 42, at 45; Richard Thaler 
& Sherwin Rosen, The Vallie of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market, ill 
HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 265-66 (Nestor E. Terleckyj ed., 1976). 
45. Indeed, if analysts did calculate the value of life itself according to the same 
compensation theory of value that underlies the valuation of risk, the benefits of regulatory 
programs that save human lives would be infinite, as "no finite amount of money could 
compensate a person for the loss of his life, simply because money is no good to him when 
he is dead." John Broome, Trying to Vallie a Life, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 92 (1978). 
46. See generally Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present FIIII/re, sl/pra 
note 14, at 2029-46, 2061-63. 
47. For discussion, see CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & THOMAS D. HOPKINS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL AGENCY VALUATIONS OF HUMAN 
LIFE, REPORT FOR RECOMMENDATION 88-7 (1988). 
48. For discussion, see Lisa Heinzerling, Discollnting Ollr Flltllre, 34 LAND & W A-
TER L. REV. 39 (1999). 
49. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, INTERAGENCY GROUP CHAIRED 
BY A MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FED-
ERAL REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866, at pt. m.B.5(a) (Jan. 11, 1996) 
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ever, monetary valuations of statistical life indeed represent only risk, 
and not life, then it is inappropriate to discount the value of statistical life 
from the probable date of death rather than from the date a risk is cre-
ated.50 
Third, the practice of disaggregating statistical lives into statistical 
life-years seems more consistent with the idea that a statistical life is a 
whole human life, than with the idea it is an aggregation of individual 
risks of death. Human lives are composed, in part, of years lived; risk is 
not. Although it might be argued that the value of a risk to individuals 
depends in part on how many years of life will be lost if one dies, the 
value of statistical life-years is not currently calculated in this manner. 
Instead, analysts estimate the value of a life-year by simply annualizing 
the value of a statistical life.5l They rarely attempt to individualize the 
valuations of life-years to take into account the special characteristics of 
the risk in question. A jarring example of this insensitivity to context 
comes from the economic analysis of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion's rule on mammography quality standards. After noting that 
$5 million was "the implied value of society's Willingness to pay to avoid 
the likelihood of an additional death," the agency stated: 
However, FDA recognizes that the studies upon which this estimate 
is based were conducted, for the most part, on male, blue-collar 
workers of approximately 30 years of age. At 30 years of age, the 
average male life expectancy is 44.2 years. Thus, the estimate im-
plies that individuals are willing to pay $5 million for 44.2 years of 
life. Amortizing $5 million over 44.2 years using a 7 percent dis-
count rate yields an unadjusted average annual value per life-year 
of $368,000. Adjusting the life expectancy of a 30-year-old male to 
account for future non-bed and bed disability ... yields an expec-
tation of 41.3 QALYs. Thus, FDA assumes that the average annual 
value of one QALY, using a 7 percent discount rate, equals 
$373,000.52 
Thus, the agency estimated the value of life-saving mammography in 
women with breast cancer based on the amount thirty-year-old male 
workers are estimated to demand in higher wages given the possibility of 
workplace accidents. By disaggregating the value of a statistical life into 
statistical life-years without any consideration of the special qualities of 
[hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]. 
50. See Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, supra note 48, at 71; Lisa Heinzer-
ling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911, 1913 (1999). 
51. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 49, at pt. ill.B.5(c). 
52. Executive Summary, Economic Analysis of U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion's Final Rule Under the Mammography Quality Standards Act of 1992, at 5-26 (on file 
with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (citations omitted). 
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the risk in question, the agency strongly suggested that it is striving to-
ward a uniform, acontextual valuation of lives and life-years that is in-
consistent with the premise that only risk-contingent, case-specific, 
fluidly perceived risk-is being valued. 
In acknowledging the monetary value of reducing risk, economic 
analysts have contributed to our growing awareness that life-threatening 
risk itself-and not just the end result of such risk, death-is an injury. 
But they have erred in pretending that risk is all there is. The fundamen-
tal problem with the conception of statistical life as risk, not life, is the 
same as the problem with defining statistical life in terms of uncertainty: 
it implicitly assumes that statistical people do not die.53 Because this is a 
question of science, not value, any attempt to resolve it through the 
monetization of, and differential valuation of, statistical lives, is to create 
a mismatch between the problem, if there is one, and its solution. In ad-
dition, because risk itself is an injury, it is wrong to allocate exposure to 
it based on characteristics like age, health, and wealth. 
As I have explained, economic analysts do not act consistently with 
their assertions that they are valuing only risk and not life. In failing to 
develop an estimate for the value of life separate and apart from the value 
of risk, in discounting from the end of life rather than from the beginning 
of risk, and in treating life-years as components of life rather than risk, 
these analysts belie the truth of their assertions that their concern is with 
risk rather than life itself. Perhaps this is a way of trying to reconcile a 
very awkward tension in their methodology. By the analysts' own ac-
count, individuals are capable of rationally and economically valuing 
only risk, not life itself. An economic account of life-saving programs 
that excluded the value of life would be quite inadequate, however. By 
proclaiming that risk is their concern, but by in fact treating the valua-
tions they derive as valuations of life itself, economic analysts have man-
aged to have it both ways. They have retained the theoretical plausibility 
of the willingness-to-pay methodology, but have put it in the service of a 
system that appears, for all the world, to have arrived at the value of life 
itself. This strategy must fail. To the extent that the willingness-to-pay 
methodology can indeed value only risk and not life, it omits a large-
probably the largest-benefit of life-saving regulation. Yet to the extent 
that it purports to value life, it is inconsistent with its own theoretical 
premises. 
53. Throughout this Comment I have spoken only of the risk of death, and death that 
is associated with the hazards regulated by federal agencies. But of course many of the 
risks that can lead to death also cause other serious problems, including illnesses that are 
painful and debilitating. See Lisa Heinzerling, Reglliatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 
107 YALE L.J. 1981,2060-63 (1998). In focusing on death here, I do not mean to slight the 
other harms caused by modem hazards. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
207 
Regulatory analysts have predicated their pricing of, and discrimi-
nations among, human lives on the idea that the lives protected by regu-
lation are statistical. By this, they either mean that no lives will be lost or 
that only risk, not life itself, is at stake. In either case, the notion is that 
statistical people do not die. But this is true only if our scientific esti-
mates of risk are so unreliable that they commonly predict deaths will 
occur where, in fact, none will. I believe this is an inaccurate, even hys-
terical, account of scientific uncertainty. In any event, if the problem 
were scientific uncertainty, the solution would not be to monetize the 
lives subject to an uncertain risk, nor to discriminate among them based 
on characteristics such as age, health, and wealth. The solution would be 
to develop better scientific estimates of risk. 
In defending the monetization of, and discrimination among, human 
lives based on the statistical nature of those lives, economic analysts have 
dehumanized the suffering and death that scientific risk assessments tell 
us will occur due to particular hazards. It is hard to understand, much 
less empathize with, statistical pain and loss. It is easier to assume that 
statistical suffering and death are things that do not happen to us-real 
people-but only to others-statistical people-and then to assume that 
the other people-statistical people-do not exist. Describing pain and 
loss in statistical terms allows us to think coolly about them; it strips life-
threatening risks of the moral and emotional texture they derive from 
their association with real humans with real bodies and real loved ones. 
Describing human lives in statistical terms thus creates the conditions 
under which human suffering and loss can be conceived of in economic 
terms, and under which this suffering and loss can be allowed to continue 
simply because the monetary value we have attached to them is lower 
than the costs of avoiding them. In inventing the statistical life, economic 
analysis has contrived the very entity it seeks to value. 
